

even under the present system that excess of production has sufficed, not only to maintain the women, children, sick, old, and infirm of the community, besides a host of unproductive consumers, but has also sufficed to form out of savings the enormous masses of capital (buildings, ships, railroads, &c., &c., &c.) that now exist. Indeed, every man with sound limbs and a sound brain, should be able to produce the equivalent of what would maintain several human beings—more, under a good; less, under a bad system.

Taking these facts into account, it will be, we think, a low estimate to value the average excess of production over consumption of these three million of men, whose idleness is changed to industry, at £50 per man annually, making a total of £150,000,000. Of course it is not their total annual production that we assume as gain, because under the present system their annual maintenance is included in the £156,000,000 devoted to military and naval expenditure. The profit to the world would be what these 3,000,000 of men would earn in excess of their own maintenance.

We have seen that the average cost of each European soldier is £45; but it must be observed that this sum comprises many other objects besides the maintenance of the soldier in food, clothes, and lodging. It comprises his relative share in all the war material, equipment, and appliances, by means of which his services are utilised—such as artillery, ammunition, horses, ships, fortifications, &c., &c. In a rough way we may assume that about one-half of the

average cost to the state of a soldier goes to his personal maintenance, and the rest to equipment, &c. In the case of a sailor the proportion is somewhat different, as his ship, armament, &c., form a heavier percentage of the total cost. We now proceed to the third head under which we have proposed to discuss "the variety of modes in which war is injurious."

CHAPTER IX.

Annual Cost of the War-system in time of Peace—Annual Cost of the War-system in time of War—Economic Results of the Conversion of Soldiers, &c., into Producers.

3. DIVERSION of capital to unproductive or destructive purposes. In addition to the £156,000,000 annually spent in Europe on war preparations, a very heavy loss is sustained by the dead capital permanently locked up in fortifications, arsenals, ships, horses, barracks, military schools, &c. This capital, the amount of which it is difficult to estimate, but which must be enormous, is sunk unproductively, and yields no return whatever. The world, therefore, loses all the wealth which would have been created through the instrumentality of that capital, had it been in active employment. We shall not attempt to assess this loss, which is obviously a very large one, but must content ourselves with pointing out its existence.

There is, however, one item which is susceptible of easy computation; it is the intercepted earnings

of the horses used in the armies of Europe. It is obvious that a horse when used for agricultural or other work, produces to its owner a certain amount of yearly profit beyond its keep, or otherwise horses would be of no value except to the wealthy as luxuries. We estimate such yearly excess of earnings over maintenance at £20 on the average. By a careful comparison of the number of horses used in the chief armies of Europe, we find that, one with the other, one horse is used for every six soldiers. Now since, under our hypothesis of the abolition of international European warfare, 3,000,000 soldiers were set free to embark in productive pursuits, so there would be 500,000 horses (now employed unproductively for war purposes) set free to earn the equivalent of £20 a year over and above their keep. This constitutes a further sum of £10,000,000 yearly that is absorbed through the supposed necessity of the war-system.

Let us now proceed to sum up the results of the foregoing calculations. We find that if inter-European wars ceased to be "necessary," and were superseded by some other device, it would make a difference annually to the populations which inhabit Europe of

£132,000,000 now spent on war preparations in
time of peace.

150,000,000 which 3,000,000 of men would
earn, who now earn nothing.

10,000,000 which 500,000 horses would earn,
which now earn nothing.

£292,000,000

Truly an enormous sum! It is equivalent to a

poll-tax of £1 sterling a year on the head of every man, woman, and child in Europe—from the babe newly born to the centenarian—from the beggar to the millionaire. It is nearly thirty times as much as the entire war expenses of the United States of America, and is double the amount of the loss which that great republic annually inflicts on herself by her adherence to the protective system. It equals the entire revenues of the four greatest European powers put together, and capitalised at fifteen years' purchase, would form a sum more than sufficient to pay off all the non-repudiated national debts of the entire world.

This calculation, be it noted, does not include the very large amount of loss occasioned, as we have before explained, by the enormous capital unproductively locked up; nor a multitude of other sources of loss, waste, and evil which are not susceptible of definite valuation in money.

And let it not be forgotten that the above picture represents the normal and permanent condition of Europe at its very best—that is, during a period of profound peace. Under the present system there cannot possibly be any improvement upon it. Indeed, every change that is at all likely to occur must be for the worse. For, if one power takes a single step forward in the direction of increased military efficiency, all the other powers, jealous and suspicious, immediately do the same, so as to maintain, at least, their previous relative positions. While, on the contrary, if any one country should do such a wise thing as to curtail her military expenditure, none would follow her example unless

all the rest did ; and of all the rest, each would wait for the others to begin. The tendency is therefore towards a constantly increasing strain on the resources of every European state, while any relaxation of that strain is out of the question. Consequently, as improvement is impossible, change is to be deprecated, and the utmost we can look for while the war-system prevails is the maintenance of our present state, burdensome as it is.

Things, therefore, have come to this pass—that, under the present system of war-arbitrament, the position which we have described is the most favourable to which Europe can aspire. This position involves the annual sacrifice, out of the wealth created by European producers, of £300,000,000 for military purposes during a period of profound peace—not, of course, for any actual services rendered beyond reviews and sham fights (unless it may be military repression of the popular voice), since we are assuming a period of profound peace—but for an exhibition on the part of each country of such an extent and readiness of military strength as shall convey a distinct warning not to offend, and a distinct menace to resent offence. This rival display on all sides of military power is the latest and most approved device for preserving peace, as set forth in the hackneyed aphorism, *Si vis pacem, bellum para*, or *Anglicè*, “If you wish to avoid fighting, show yourself ready to fight.”

It was on this plausible principle that our forefathers acted, when, to deter or resist assailants, they habitually wore swords as part of their dress. This

practice did not, however, lead to peaceful results in private life, but, on the contrary, to constant broils and frequent bloodshed. Let us hope, if we can, that its application to international intercourse will be more successful. For if it is not, we are drifting into a state of things that must become intolerable. But even if it is, we shall be no better, but simply no worse off. Supposing that all goes right—that these rival parades of brute force (so like the game of “brag”) do really stave off war—that nations may, by showing, like dogs, what formidable teeth they possess, discourage attacks on one another—that each member of the “great European family” may succeed in keeping the others in a peaceful and friendly attitude by significantly brandishing a stout cudgel, and suspiciously watching their movements—well, what then? Why, then we, the workers and producers of Europe, have simply obtained immunity from war at an annual cost to us (during peace) of £300,000,000.

But, on the other hand, supposing that all does not go right, and that, in spite of the boasted principle that “to be prepared for war prevents war,” the great European powers should quarrel, and a general war ensue—what then? Why, then, the very fact of every country possessing a large available army on a peace footing, together with the outline, quickly filled in, of a much larger army on a war footing, supplemented by an enormous number of territorial reserves and militia, is of itself an immense additional evil. The more numerous and the better equipped are the masses

of human beings who, in time of war, are launched from either side to grapple with each other in mortal conflict, the greater must be the slaughter and the waste—the greater the effusion of blood and the sacrifice of treasure. If the preparations for war (which were to preserve peace) cost Europe £300,000,000 yearly, how much will the actuality of war cost her?

We have seen at p. 98 that the number of armed men in readiness to serve on the war footing in the various states of Europe was 10,500,000; that is, three times the number of those maintained on the peace footing. We also saw that the aggregate expenditure on the armies and navies of Europe on the peace footing was £156,000,000. To arrive at the probable expenditure under war conditions, it is obvious that to multiply the above sum only by three, because the number of men was only increased threefold, would be utterly erroneous and insufficient. The increased expenses during war are very far more than in mere proportion to the additional number of men employed. For instance, the conveyance of large bodies of troops from one place to another, whether by land or by sea—the additional cost under those circumstances of the commissariat—the rapid destruction, and consequent necessary replacement, of men, horses, ammunition, artillery, and war materials of all kinds—the additional expense of medical attendants, ambulances, hospitals, &c., for the wounded—in short, a hundred sources of extra expenditure having no existence in time of peace distend the increased amount to proportions not easily

definable. We shall call it double, though it must actually be much more; but the figures are quite sufficiently impressive, even when computed on the most moderate scale.

Let us now proceed, on the data which we have been able to collect, to calculate what would be the money loss by a general European war, supposing that it only lasted one year:—

Loss of the net earnings of 10,500,000 men, taken away from productive labour at £50 per annum (see p. 104)	£ 525,000,000
Loss of the net earnings of 1,500,000 horses, used for destruction, not for production	30,000,000
European war expenditure for one year, taking the cost of each fighting man at twice that of time of peace	945,000,000
European expenditure in one year	£1,500,000,000

We fancy that we hear many exclaiming, "Absurd! Monstrous! It cannot be!" Well! That the amount is really a monstrous one, and that it does appear absurd, we readily admit. But that "it cannot be" goes for nothing, when we consider the vast multitude of things that "could not be," but which, nevertheless, actually are. If what we state is a fact, or approximatively a fact,

"can't be" melts into a mere querulous exclamation, as it has done in the face of a multitude of other facts at various times. "Can't be" is no answer to what is. The question really is, "Where is the error in our calculations?" We believe them, after the most careful consideration, to be under, and not over, the truth. If the amount takes us by surprise, it is because we have not hitherto faced the question boldly. We have contented ourselves with vague generalities, and kept clear of details and of figures of arithmetic. We readily agree that it is indeed "absurd and monstrous" that international disputes should cost so enormously to settle by the present brute-force method. Whether there may or may not be some other mode of settlement is not the point now under discussion. We are assuming here that the present system of war-arbitrament is the only possible one, and are quietly ascertaining what amount Europe has to pay for the privilege of resorting to it. We hypothetically assume its necessity, and simply desire to know its cost. That cost we find to be £300,000,000 per annum in time of peace, and would be £1,500,000,000 in case of a general European war.

Stupendous sums truly! The latter of which would make all the difference between privation and comfort to every labour-selling family in Europe. But, of course, if it be clearly made out that war is a positive necessity, we must quietly lie down, grumble, and submit. If it be the only means by which differences of opinion or divergences of policy between civilised governments can

be adjusted, then we must bow sadly to our destiny, and content ourselves with gauging the extent of sacrifice which that necessity extorts from us. If civilised polity cannot exist without the institution of war-arbitrament, it must at least be some small consolation to know what is the price which we have to pay for the blessings of civilisation, as so exemplified.

But it may be said that we have exaggerated the number of men and the extent of expenditure required by a European war, since we have taken the extreme limit of both, and have assumed the improbable case of every one of the seventeen states of Europe being involved in war simultaneously. True; and some allowance off our calculation may be made, according to the greater or lesser range of the war. But that this allowance cannot be a large one will be evident from the following considerations: 1. In case of a European war, the five powers which would almost of necessity be engaged in it, especially if it lasted beyond one campaign, are Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia. Now of these five powers the aggregate war-contingent is 8,000,000 men, out of the total for Europe of 10,500,000—a large proportion of the whole. 2. The other twelve states of Europe, though not active belligerents, would most of them, as a matter of precaution and defence, raise their armies to the war footing, and thereby incur the war expenditure. 3. We have not in our estimates of men, money, and loss of production taken into account the territorial levies and the reserves of each state. Their absorption

in the war movement would be considerable, and would go far to countervail the men, money, and productive power saved by the disconnection of the minor states from actual warfare. But make any reasonable deduction you like, quite enough remains. For, if £1,500,000,000 per annum is "monstrous and absurd," £1,250,000,000 is hardly less so.

We may also observe that in assessing the extent of wealth-annihilation occasioned by actual war, we have omitted several minor items, to three of which we will briefly advert. 1. The destruction of property on the lines of march of the several armies. There is no neutral or desert ground on which contending armies could meet in conflict. Either one country or the other must furnish the battle-field, and woe to the soil that is consequently invaded! Villages are burned, forced contributions are levied, houses and property are sacked and pillaged, families are ousted from their homes, cattle and forage are confiscated, fields are left uncultivated, factories are shut up, troops are quartered on the inhabitants who are left, and, to say nothing of the personal indignities and outrages inflicted, utter desolation succeeds to comfort and abundance throughout entire provinces. The accruing loss of wealth and of productive power, who can compute? 2. Another form of the destruction of productive power is exemplified in the case of the dead, the wounded, the disabled, and of those whom disease, camp-habits, or disuse have rendered unfit for industrial work. 3. The corroding cares, anxieties and terrors which must

agitate the family of the bread-winner while on his march to the battle-field, and their unutterable grief and desolation if he should prove one of the victims—are these things not to be taken into account? The despair-shrieks of the bereft ones never reach the ears of the war-chief, but are they any the less real and poignant?

But stay, this is not the place to dwell on the moral or æsthetic view of the subject. That belongs to rhetoric and poetry. Our business is with its severe economic aspect. As wealth dwindles, somebody must suffer, and the suffering mainly falls on the poor and weak. The capitalist is mulcted of part of his wealth, but he can wait. The labour-seller is mulcted of the necessaries of life, and he and his dear ones cannot wait. The less there is produced, the less there is to distribute. Need we say which class it is that will run short?

It is on you, labour-sellers of the world! that the burden chiefly falls. It is you who are the slayers and the slain. You form the rank and file who deal the blows and on whom the blows are dealt. To your chiefs belong the honour and the rewards. As for you, you are under contract to suffer and to cause suffering; to inflict and to endure death; to destroy instead of creating wealth; and to use every effort to suppress the fund out of which labour is paid. The war-system, pernicious to every class, is a special curse to yours. Are you content to view it as a "necessity"? In this our protest against it, we look for your special assistance by thought, word, and pen. Public opinion is made up of assenting units.

But some one may say, "If, out of the European peace-war establishments of 3,500,000 men, 3,000,000 were, as you propose, to be disbanded, this additional supply of 3,000,000 workers would swamp the labour market, depress wages, and, being in excess of demand, cause great distress and destitution." The answer is easy. Simultaneously, with that disbandment, there would be a reduction of expenditure, and, therefore, of taxes, of £142,000,000 (see p. 102), that having been the sum required to equip and maintain those 3,000,000 of soldiers. That sum, no longer levied by the governments, would remain in the pockets of the people, and would be so much more spent by them in wages, for, as we have shown, all money spent goes to the payment of labour. It would mostly find its way to the 3,000,000 of men seeking employment, no longer as soldiers, but, far better than that, as producers in various branches of industry. Thus the £132,000,000 that had before been spent unproductively would now be spent reproductively. While the labour market would be affected one way by the influx of 3,000,000 of labour-sellers, it would be affected in the opposite direction by the influx of £142,000,000 of capital seeking for labour as the means of its utilisation. It must also be borne in mind that both the disbandment of the soldiers and the saving of the expenditure would doubtless be, not sudden but gradual, so that the adaptation of the fresh supply of labour and the fresh supply of capital to each other would be a smooth and almost imperceptible transition.

Fears may also be expressed lest such influx of labour should occasion a glut of commodities. So no doubt it would, if all the disbanded soldiers belonged to the same trade, and all went back to it. But that is quite out of the question. Soldiers are taken promiscuously from all branches of industry—the plough, the loom, the mine, the foundry, the shop, &c. &c.—and naturally each man would endeavour to get back to his old avocation. Thus there would be a fair balance between their labours, and there would simply be more of all kinds of commodities to exchange one with the other. As we have shown at p. 7, no such thing as a general glut of all articles is possible, for each finds some desirable counterpart, and none are redundant; so that the so-called general glut simply becomes general abundance. A "glut," therefore, does not mean universal over-production, but the special over-production of one or more articles as compared with the rest. Of course, the liability to gluts is much greater when countries are commercially isolated from each other than when commercial intercourse is unrestricted; just as averages are more regular and constant when taken from wide, than when taken from contracted areas.

The supposition that the conversion of 3,000,000 non-producing into productive consumers might be detrimental to the interests of the labour-sellers, would, if admitted, lead to a curious paradox. "The fewer the workers," it is said, "the smaller the competition among them and the better the wages." Now, let us follow this up. "The fewer the workers the better," means the less there is

produced the better—which again means, the less there is to distribute among everybody the better. Is not this a palpable absurdity? Why not, then, reduce the number of workers still further? To travesty an old couplet, to those who say, “Our gain is great because our work is small,” we reply, “Then ’twould be greater if none worked at all.” The fallacy lies in this. The producers who are so jealous of competition forget that the unproductive consumers (whom they wish to remain so) have to be maintained out of the produce of their (the producers’) labour; and the greater or lesser the disproportion of numbers, the heavier or the lighter the burden. It is just as in a strike for, say 5 per cent. difference in wages. Those at work may ultimately get some benefit, but meanwhile they have to support their mates who are out on strike, at an expense far exceeding the 5 per cent. difference in wages, and the more numerous the non-workers, the greater the expense. To keep the 3,000,000 soldiers out of the labour-market, the producers of Europe (combined labour, land, and capital) have to furnish their governments annually with £132,000,000—an absurdly heavy tax to pay for keeping down the number of producers, and for reducing the amount of production—a costly mode of securing an undesirable object!

CHAPTER X.

National Debts Incurred for War Purposes—Their Results and their Limits—General Remarks on the Destructiveness of War.

WE now come to another of the “modes in which war is injurious.” The various governments of the world are indebted to a number of private individuals in the vast aggregate sum of about £5,000,000,000. This amount, which was borrowed at various times and under various pretexts, those governments are under engagement to return, and meanwhile to pay annual interest thereon amounting to about £212,000,000. On the other hand, several governments have already declared themselves defaulters, have ceased paying the interest, and are not likely ever to pay the principal of their debts. Deducting these, there remain about £4,000,000,000 of unrepudiated national debts, on which the annual interest payable is about £170,000,000. Of the enormous principal in question, a portion (chiefly that lent to the United States and to our own colonies) has been borrowed for, and applied to, purposes of internal improvement, but, at the very least, three-fourths has been squandered on war expenses. The money is gone, the debt remains. Governments found it convenient, and deemed it not unjust, to borrow in the name, and for account, of posterity, and to mortgage the earnings of future generations in order to wage present war with greater efficiency. Accordingly, the world (Europe chiefly) has to pay a perpetual annuity of £170,000,000 in redemption of unauthorised